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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
Sergey Boltutskiy appeals a final judgment of the District Court sentencing him to 
180 months in prison for conspiring to illegally export night vision devices to Belarus.  
Boltutskiy argues that the harshness of his sentence is unsupported by the factual record 
and that his sentence is unreasonably disproportionate when compared to sentences 
imposed in similar cases. 
We will affirm.  The record contains ample support for the findings that the 
District Court relied upon in sentencing Boltutskiy.  Moreover, he has not carried his 
burden to show that his sentence is unreasonably disproportionate.1 
I. 
A grand jury indicted Boltutskiy for conspiring with seven others to export night 
vision devices to Belarus and for laundering money to facilitate the illegal sale of these 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 Our decision to affirm obviates the need to consider Boltutskiy’s argument that, if we 
were to remand for resentencing, we should assign this case to a different judge.  
Nevertheless, we note that there is no merit to Boltutskiy’s argument that he was treated 
unfairly by the District Court.  Although at times the Court may have expressed 
frustration with Boltutskiy’s counsel, “judicial remarks during the course of a trial that 
are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, 
ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.”  Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 
540, 555 (1994). 
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devices.  These devices make weapons more accurate at night.  Because the ability to 
shoot weapons accurately in the dark poses a serious threat to the military, it is illegal to 
export night vision devices without first obtaining a license.  See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2778.  
Boltutskiy admitted to exporting night vision devices, but claimed that his purpose for 
doing so was to sell the devices to his Belarussian acquaintances who hunt pigs.  The 
Government’s investigation, however, uncovered evidence showing that Boltutskiy had 
facilitated or attempted to facilitate at least $749,000 in illegal sales, and that these sales 
were not limited to Belarussian acquaintances.  This evidence included email 
correspondence with a prospective buyer in Russia who explained that he needed a night 
vision device for a Russian security service. 
Boltutskiy eventually pleaded guilty to charges that he conspired to illegally 
export night vision devices in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 317 and 50 U.S.C. § 1705, and 
further, that he conspired to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956(h). 
Prior to sentencing, the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services Office prepared a 
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) in which it concluded that Boltutskiy’s base 
level sentencing range was 108 to 135 months.  In arriving at this conclusion, the Pretrial 
Services Office applied a four-level upward adjustment because it found that Boltutskiy 
was responsible for organizing and leading the conspiracies for which he was convicted. 
Boltutskiy objected to the PSR on several grounds.  First, he maintained that he 
had exported the night vision devices solely for hunting purposes.  Second, he denied the 
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Government’s characterization of him as an international arms dealer.  Third, he 
disclaimed knowledge of actions taken by his alleged co-conspirators.  For its part, the 
Government requested that the District Court add three offense levels, which would result 
in a range of 151 to 188 months. 
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing in advance of sentencing.  At the 
hearing, the Government opposed Boltutskiy’s objections to the PSR with testimony from 
several witnesses: (1) a U.S. Army Colonel, who testified as an expert about the security 
and safety threats posed by night vision devices; (2) a co-conspirator, who provided 
details about the conspiracy and Boltutskiy’s role in leading it; and (3) a Special Agent 
with the Department of Homeland Security, who discussed evidence from the 
investigation into Boltutskiy’s crimes.  At Boltutskiy’s request, the Court continued the 
hearing to allow him further time to call rebuttal witnesses. 
When the hearing resumed, Boltutskiy presented testimony from the following 
witnesses: (1) friends from Belarus, who testified about their use of night vision devices 
while hunting; (2) an expert in night vision devices, who opined that the various devices 
sold by Boltutskiy would not be optimal for combat; and (3) Boltutskiy himself, who 
reiterated that pig hunting was the only purpose for which he intended the devices to be 
used. 
At the close of the hearing, the Court overruled Boltutskiy’s objections to the PSR, 
granted the Government’s request for an upward variance, and sentenced Boltutskiy to 
180 months in prison.  In doing so, the Court emphasized the national security threat 
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created by the illegal export of night vision devices, Boltutskiy’s lack of remorse, and the 
need for deterring conduct that jeopardizes the safety of American service members.  The 
Court later issued a detailed order restating and elaborating on the reasons for its 
decision. 
Boltutskiy timely appealed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
III. 
Boltutskiy’s first argument is that the Court should not have adopted the PSR’s 
recommendation that he receive an upward adjustment for his role in leading the money 
laundering conspiracy.  According to Boltutskiy, the Court never engaged in fact finding 
regarding whether he led the money laundering conspiracy; instead, he claims, the Court 
found only that he led the conspiracy to export night vision devices. 
Boltutskiy concedes that he did not raise this issue before the District Court, and 
thus that we must review it for plain error.  “Under this standard we must find that (1) an 
error was committed, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the error 
affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”  United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 206 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
This argument fails under the first prong of the plain error test because the District 
Court did not err.  Contrary to Boltutskiy’s claim, the Court did in fact make findings on 
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the record about his role in the conspiracy and then based the upward adjustment on those 
findings.  It applied a four-level upward adjustment, concluding that “the Government 
proved beyond a preponderance that Defendant headed the conspiracy.”  App. at 16.  
Although the Court did not initially specify the particular conspiracy to which it was 
referring, it continued:  “The Government presented credible evidence that Defendant 
directed co-conspirators Yasev, Osin, Shapakovsky, Belski, Tsishuk, Stashynski, and 
Dubouskaya to purchase and export devices, and to transfer or wire funds to pay for the 
devices.”  App. at 16 (emphases added).  Moreover, Boltutskiy’s role in leading the 
money laundering scheme was among the reasons cited in the PSR for recommending the 
upward adjustment: “[t]he defendant provided money for the purchase of items, shipping 
fees, and commission fees for other participants . . . [and] directed others regarding what 
items should be purchased and how much money should be spent on the purchase of 
devices.”  PSR ¶ 57.  By adopting the PSR’s recommendations, the Court adopted its 
findings and based the upward adjustment on Boltutskiy’s role in leading the money 
laundering conspiracy. 
IV. 
Boltutskiy’s second argument is that Court’s imposition of a substantial upward 
variance was erroneous because it was based on unsupported factual findings.  The 
Court’s decision to impose an upward variance was based largely on three particular 
factual findings: (1) Boltutskiy exported a very large number of night vision devices; (2) 
the scope of his involvement in the conspiracy was broad; and (3) the conspiracy posed 
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serious safety and national security threats.  Boltutskiy argues that these three findings 
are unsupported by the record. 
We review the District Court’s factual findings for clear error.  United States v. 
Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 797 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Factual findings in relation to sentencing 
issues are reviewed for clear error.”).  This standard of review is highly deferential and 
permits reversal only where the factual findings at issue are “completely devoid of 
minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility” or are without “rational 
relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.”  United States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 
204 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972)).  
Here, the Government had the burden at sentencing to prove any disputed fact by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir. 
2007).  As discussed below, the District Court’s factual findings were not clearly 
erroneous.   
A. 
The first factual finding that Boltutskiy disputes is that the number of devices he 
illegally exported was “very large.”  App. at 21.  He claims that the record does not 
support this characterization, and further, that the District Court was wrong when it stated 
that he exported “hundreds” of devices.  Appellant’s Br. at 29-30.  He also argues that the 
Court erred by holding him responsible for “all” of the actions taken by his co-
conspirators, as opposed to just those actions that were “reasonably foreseeable” in light 
of the conspiracy.  Appellant’s Br. at 31-35. 
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The Court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.  When Boltutskiy pleaded guilty, 
he admitted the factual basis for the plea, which included the statement that he “conspired 
with fellow Belarussians to purchase and illegally export a large number of high-tech 
night-vision devices with military applications.”  Supp. App. at 9 (emphasis added).  One 
of his co-conspirators testified that he shipped “[b]etween 75 and 100” night vision 
devices to Boltutskiy.  App. at 133.  Special Agent Zuchman provided testimony 
concerning itemized lists of specific sales that Boltutskiy was responsible for facilitating 
as part of the conspiracy.  These lists include over a hundred devices collectively worth 
hundreds of thousands of dollars that Boltutskiy and/or his co-conspirators sold or 
attempted to sell.  The Court found this evidence credible and additionally noted that, by 
pleading guilty to the conspiracy, Boltutskiy became responsible for the actions of his co-
conspirators.  Although it may have been an exaggeration to characterize the number of 
devices as in the “hundreds,” the Court on two occasions during the hearing 
acknowledged that this number was likely in the “dozens.”  See App. at 195 (“Dozens, I 
will say dozens of these weapons.”); 196-97 (“[W]hen I said hundreds, I misspoke. I will 
say dozens.”).  But even if it was erroneous to occasionally mention “hundreds” of 
devices, such a mistake is not a clear factual error that merits reversal under our 
deferential standard of review. 
Finally, contrary to Boltutskiy’s claim, the Court did not hold him responsible for 
“all” his co-conspirators’ actions.  Rather, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), the District Court made clear 
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that Boltutskiy was responsible for the “reasonably foreseeable” consequences of the 
conspiracy.  App. at 14-15 (quoting United States v. Ramos, 147 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 
1998)).  In sum, the Court’s finding that Boltutskiy shipped a “very large” number of 
night vision devices is not clearly erroneous. 
B. 
The second factual finding that Boltutskiy disputes is that he could be fairly 
characterized as an “international arms dealer.”  App. at 20.  According to the Court, this 
characterization is warranted because Boltutskiy purchased numerous night vision 
devices, arranged for their illegal export, wired money internationally, and facilitated 
sales of these devices in foreign countries.  Boltutskiy claims the record does not support 
the finding that he was an international arms dealer. 
The Court did not clearly err in so characterizing Boltutskiy.  His argument to the 
contrary boils down to a dispute over whom the Court should have believed: Boltutskiy, 
who claimed he was exporting night vision devices for pig hunting; or the Government, 
who claimed he was exporting them for the broader purpose of profiting off the 
international black market.  The Court plainly believed the Government, finding that it 
“presented considerable evidence to refute Defendant’s absurd contention that he 
knowingly broke federal law and smuggled out three quarters of a million dollars in 
military grade, export-controlled hardware solely so he and his friends could sport hunt.”  
App. at 18 (emphasis in original). 
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Ample evidence supports this factual finding.  First, Boltutskiy pleaded guilty to 
knowingly violating federal law by exporting a large number of “night vision devices 
with military applications.”  Supp. App. at 9.  Second, the Government’s expert witness, 
Colonel McDonnell, provided testimony undercutting Boltutskiy’s claim that the devices 
at issue would have been inappropriate for use in combat.  Third, the Government 
presented emails exchanged between Boltutskiy and vendors in foreign countries other 
than Belarus showing that his export scheme was not limited to his friends.  For example, 
Boltutskiy corresponded with a prospective Russian customer who stated, “I don’t know 
you.”  Supp. App. at 77.  He also corresponded with a prospective Russian customer who 
explained that he needed a particular device for “one of the support units of the CK,” a 
term that refers to a Russian security service.  App. at 358. 
This evidence does not lose its persuasive weight merely because of testimony 
from Boltutskiy’s expert, Dr. Ostromek, who testified that many of the night vision 
devices at issue were dual use items, i.e., designed for both military and non-military 
uses.  The fact that the devices could be used for hunting does not eliminate the security 
risk posed by the fact that they could also be used in combat.  As such, the Court’s 
characterization of Boltutskiy as an international arms dealer is not clearly erroneous. 
C. 
The third finding that Boltutskiy disputes is that his conspiracy to illegally export 
night devices posed a serious threat to our national security.  The District Court found 
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that “serious harm . . . could result from the [night vision] devices falling into the hands 
of individuals whose interests are inimical to those of the United States.”  App. at 21. 
The record contains extensive support for the Court’s finding regarding national 
security.  As Colonel McDonnell explained, the safety and efficacy of U.S. military 
operations depend on its superior night vision technology, which is one of its greatest 
tactical advantages.  He expressed three concerns: “The first is that the devices fall into 
the hands of the enemies and they’re used against our troops.  Secondly is that 
countermeasures are developed to defeat the capabilities of the devices.  And third is that 
the devices are taken apart, reverse engineered and then mass produced.”  App. at 76.  As 
Special Agent Zuchman put it, “night vision devices, in the hands of the wrong people, 
take away the greatest capability of the Armed Forces of the U.S.”  App. at 174. 
In seeking to undermine this evidence, Boltutskiy identifies particular features of 
the night vision devices at issue and argues that these features would make the devices 
useless in combat.  For example, his expert, Dr. Ostromek, testified that the night vision 
devices at issue reflect light off their lenses and give off a traceable electronic signal.  
According to Boltutskiy, these features would dissuade hostile forces from using the 
devices in combat. 
But even Dr. Ostromek acknowledged that, at a minimum, certain of these 
particular night vision devices would be better than having no devices at all.  He also 
acknowledged that, at a minimum, they would be useful to adversaries lacking 
sophisticated night vision technology because the devices could be reverse engineered.  
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More importantly, the Court found Dr. Ostromek’s testimony only partially credible.  For 
example, the Court did not credit his testimony that the “monocular” night vision devices 
involved in the conspiracy would be useless to enemy combatants.  App. at 333 (“I 
simply don’t credit Dr. O[stromek]’s testimony that people use these monoculars simply 
to figure out where they are.  I think they help them find targets whether they’re mounted 
on guns or not.”).  Accordingly, the Court’s finding that Boltutskiy’s conspiracy 
presented a safety and security threat was not clearly erroneous.2 
V. 
Boltutskiy’s third argument is that his 180-month sentence is disproportionately 
harsh, and thus, that it violates the principle that courts should “avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
of similar conduct.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  In support, he directs us to cases from a 
document published by the U.S. Department of Justice that showcases success stories in 
apprehending international smugglers, spies, and thieves. 
To demonstrate an unreasonable sentencing disparity, Boltutskiy must carry the 
heavy burden of showing that his circumstances “exactly” paralleled the circumstances at 
                                              
2 There is no merit to Boltutskiy’s related legal argument that the District Court could not 
rely on this safety and security threat in imposing an upward variance.  It is true that the 
threat was already “built in” to the base level range.  Appellant’s Br. at 43-44 (citing 
U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2, Note 1).  This, however, does not preclude the Court from giving 
further consideration to the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  See Koon v. 
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (noting that district courts can rely on factors 
already taken into account by the Guidelines if the factors are present in an “exceptional 
degree” or the case is otherwise “different from the ordinary case”). 
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issue in other cases involving disparately lenient sentences.  United States v. Charles, 467 
F.3d 828, 833 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006).  We “should not consider sentences imposed on 
defendants in other cases in the absence of such a showing by a party.”  United States v. 
Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 100 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. 
Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Boltutskiy has not carried his burden to show that his sentence is unreasonably 
disproportionate.  Although his sentence is indeed harsh when compared to the cases he 
cites from the DOJ document, he has not shown that any of these cases are “exactly 
parallel” to his.  For example, he cites a case where the defendant was convicted of 
violating a statute carrying a maximum penalty of twenty years.  See Appellant’s Br. at 
56 (citing United States v. Assi, 428 F. App’x 570, 571 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussing 
penalty imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B)).  In contrast, Boltutskiy was convicted of 
violating three statutes that collectively carry a maximum penalty of forty-five years.  
Moreover, several of the specific cases he cites involve defendants who appear to have 
been apprehended before succeeding in their attempts to export prohibited technology, 
whereas in this case, Boltutskiy was found to have actually exported numerous night 
vision devices.  And, as the Government points out, the base level sentencing range 
proposed by the Pretrial Services Office in this case—i.e., before any upward variance—




We will “tolerate statutory sentencing disparities” as long as the District Court 
exercised its discretion reasonably and applied the Sentencing Guidelines correctly.  
Charles, 467 F.3d at 833.  For example, in United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 
2008), a defendant received a forty-month sentence.  Id. at 90.  On appeal, he argued that 
his sentence was disproportionate in light of a similar case where the defendant received 
a twelve-month sentence.  Id.  We affirmed his sentence and emphasized that the mere 
citation of similar cases is not enough to demonstrate an unwarranted sentencing 
disparity: “This is not, and cannot be, the law. Although a similar sentence might also be 
reasonable here, that does not make [the defendant’s] sentence unreasonable.”  Id. at 91.  
In accordance with this authority, the District Court in this case regarded the Guidelines 
as advisory, and then imposed Boltutskiy’s 180-month sentence after a meaningful 
application of its discretionary authority to apply the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.  
Boltutskiy’s sentence was not unreasonably disparate. 
VI. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
